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CONTROLLING ISSUE OF UTAH LAW CERTIFIED TO THIS COURT 
Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section § 401(a) pf the IRC despite failing to 
fulfill that section's requirements for qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the 
plan from his bankruptcy estate property? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000) provides as follows: 
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution. 
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption o|f the following 
property: 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any 
money or other assets held for or payable to the individual as 
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest! of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a Retirement plan 
or arrangement that is described in Section 40jl(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1^86, as 
amended; 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Douglas James Reinhart (the "Debtor") filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition on January 28, 2000 (the "Petition Date"). (Aplt. App. DLG00016,1 4a.)1 
In his amended schedules, the Debtor claimed an exemption for $333,835.65 contained 
in his alleged Keogh plan under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (l)(a)(x) (2000).3 Under this 
statute, funds contained in Keogh plans that are "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code are exempt from the claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy.4 
Chapter 7 Trustee, David Gladwell (the 'Trustee"), timely objected to the claimed 
exemption. (Aplt. App. DLG00012-00014.) He asserted, among other things, that 
because of operational defaults, the alleged Keogh plan was not a "qualified plan" under 
1
 Citations to the record in the Tenth Circuit are to Appellant's Appendix filed in 
the Tenth Circuit, which is also on file in this Court. 
2
 In his amended schedules filed on May 16, 2000, the Debtor initially claimed 
that $306,000 was in the alleged Keogh plan on the Petition Date. He amended his 
schedules again in September 2006, increasing that amount to $333,835.65. (Aplt. App. 
DLG00016-00017, % 4 b and d.) 
3
 This statute is now found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505 (l)(a)(xiv) (2008). 
When determining the validity of a claimed state law exemption, bankruptcy law looks to 
applicable state law. In re Hodes, 402 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2005), (citing In re 
Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
4
 Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the 
Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the exemptions available under state law are the 
exemptions available under the Bankruptcy Code for debtors residing in Utah. See 11 
U.S.C. § 522 (b); former Utah Code Ann § 78-23-15 (2000); current Utah Code Ann § 
78B-5-513(2008). 
2 
§ 401(a) on the Petition Date,5 and, therefore, the funds therein were not contained in a 
plan "described in" §401(a). 
On the facts presented at trial (most of which were undisputed), the bankruptcy 
court entered oral findings and conclusions (Aplt. App. DLGP0034-00059, Add. B 
hereto) determining that the alleged Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on the 
Petition Date. (Add. B hereto, p. 428/13-14.) Despite this determination and the 
bankruptcy court's conclusion that the plan was "arguably n0t tax qualified," the court 
determined that the plan was "nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)," and that 
therefore the funds in the plan were exempt under the Utah Statute. (Add. B hereto, p. 
428/7-12.)6 On June 8, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court entered lits written order to that 
effect. (Add. A hereto.) 
The district court entered its order affirming the bankruptcy court order on 
February 6, 2009. (Add. C hereto.) The district court incorporated by reference the 
bankruptcy court's oral findings and conclusions regarding the exempt status of the funds 
in the plan. Id. The Trustee timely appealed the district cou^t decision to the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. (Aplt. App. DLG00375-00377.) 
Exemptions are determined based upon the status of the property on the petition 
date. See e.g. In re Rowe, 236 B.R. 11, 14 (9th Cir. B.A.P. (999); In re Lawrence, 235 
B.R. 498, 509 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 244 B.R. 868 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (notwithstanding Internal Revenue Code provisions allowing for retroactive cure of 
plan disqualification, a pension plan that is not qualified or* the petition date is not 
entitled to state law exemption for qualified plans). 
6
 The bankruptcy court's oral findings and conclusions are discussed further in the 
Statement of Facts, below. 
3 
The Trustee's appeal to the Tenth Circuit was fully briefed7 and argued. On 
December 22, 2009, the Tenth Circuit issued its Order Certifying State Law Question 
(the "First Certification Order," Add. D hereto). 
On January 5, 2010, the Debtor filed a Petition for Panel Rehearing (on file in this 
Court). The Debtor made two arguments. First, the Debtor (accurately) pointed out that 
in the First Certification Order the Tenth Circuit had slightly misquoted former § 78-23-5 
(l)(a)(x) by using term "described by" rather than "described in." Second, the Debtor 
argued that the First Certification Order should not have determined that the Debtor's 
Keogh Plan was not "qualified under" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code on the 
Q 
Petition Date, because the bankruptcy court had made no such finding. 
The Tenth Circuit accepted the Debtor's first argument, but rejected his second 
argument. See Order entered January 25, 2010, treating the Debtor's petition for 
rehearing as a motion to reconsider and granting it in part and denying it in part. (Add. E 
hereto.) Thus, on January 25, 2010, the Tenth Circuit entered a second Order Certifying 
State Law Question (the "Second Certification Order," Add. F hereto) changing only the 
Utah statutory reference from "described by" to "described in." On March 8, 2010, this 
Court entered its Order of Acceptance, accepting the certified question in the Second 
Certification Order. 
The Trustee's opening and reply briefs in the Tenth Circuit, and the Debtor's 
brief in the Tenth Circuit, are on file in this Court. 
8
 The Debtor also proposed the following statement of the issue to be certified to 
this Court: "Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section 401(a) of the IRC despite being 
operationally in default on the bankruptcy petition date, thereby entitling the debtor to 
exempt the plan from his bankruptcy estate property?" 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
From 1992 to the Petition Date, the Debtor worked a^  an anesthesiologist in 
Ogden, Utah. Initially, he operated as a sole proprietor and, in 1996, he incorporated his 
practice as Douglas Reinhart, M.D., P.C. (the "PC"). The D|ebtor was the sole 
shareholder and the president of the PC. (Aplt. App. DLGOOO 16-00017, ^ 4 a, e, f, g, h.) 
In December 1992, the Debtor (as a sole proprietor) established his alleged Keogh 
plan by adopting a prototype Keogh plan offered through Charles Schwab & Co. 
("Schwab"), which included a money purchase pension plan component and a profit 
sharing plan component for himself and his employees. The Debtor was the Keogh plan 
administrator, and he made contributions for his benefit every year after adoption. No 
employees other than the Debtor were ever made participants or received contributions 
under the Keogh plan. (Aplt. App. DLGOOO 17-00019, ^ 4 a, i, j , o, p, q, s, u, v, w, x, y, z. 
aa; Add. B hereto, p. 419/17-23.) 
One of the non-waivable requirements of the Keogh |plan was that all eligible 
employees be made participants. (Aplt. App. DLG00208/16-19; Add. B hereto, p. 420/3-
4.) The Debtor did not ensure that this requirement was m0t. His wife, Janet Reinhart 
("Janet"), was an eligible employee from 1993 to the Petition Date, but was never 
included as a participant and never received any of the mandatory or discretionary 
contributions provided for under the Keogh plan. (Aplt. A#>p. DLGOOO 17-00019, H 4 k, 
1, v, w, x, y, z, aa.) The Debtor admitted that Janet had specifically requested to be a 
participant and that he never acted upon her request. [Aplt. App. DLG00191-00194 (Tr. 
89/23-92/8); DLG00275-00280.] 
5 
When the Debtor incorporated the PC in January 1996, he ceased to be self-
employed and became an employee of the PC. However, rather than cause the PC to 
adopt a new plan or restate the Keogh plan as its own, the Debtor caused the PC to 
continue making contributions to the Keogh plan as if he remained a self-employed 
individual. (Aplt. App. DLG00018, ^ 4 p, q.) The Debtor ultimately did cause the PC to 
adopt and restate the Keogh plan as a corporate pension plan, but this did not occur until 
August 16, 2001, more than a year-and-a-half after the Petition Date, and after the 
Trustee had filed his objection. (Add. B hereto, pp. 417/14 - 418/1; Aplt. App. 
DLG00141-00149.) 
Although the Debtor (and his PC) made contributions to the Keogh plan every 
year, the contributions were not in the manner required. (Aplt. App. DLG00100.) For 
example, under the money purchase plan component, the Debtor was required to make 
contributions of 10% of each participant's annual compensation. He did not do so. Id. 
The Keogh plan documents provided that the money purchase contribution was 
mandatory and that failure to fund would "cause the employer's Schwab Plan to be an 
individually designated plan (as described in the Schwab Plan section 10.2)." [Aplt. App. 
DLG00122, §§ 3.1(b) and 3.1(d).] 
Additionally, the Keogh plan required contributions to be made exclusively 
through Schwab as the Keogh plan "custodian." [Id. at § 3.1(d).] The Debtor 
disregarded this requirement by directing investments through himself as the self-
designated "trustee" of the Keogh plan. Specifically, in December 1999, he made a 
$10,400 contribution (through himself as the alleged plan trustee) to fund a secured 
6 
automobile loan to Colleen Parker (the "Parker Loan"). (Aplt. App. DLG00018, ^ 4u and 
DLG00101-00112.) Finally, for the year 2000, the Debtor caused contributions to be 
made that were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits set under 
§ 415(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Aplt. App. DLG00J00, DLG00136-00140, and 
DLG00177-00178.) 
At trial, the Trustee's expert on qualification of plans under § 401(a), W. Waldan 
Lloyd, testified that, according to IRS practices and procedures, several of the operational 
defects described above resulted in disqualification of the Keogh plan as of the Petition 
Date.9 (Aplt. App. DLG00194-00259.) The bankruptcy court found Mr. Lloyd's 
unrebutted testimony to be "credible." Also, the bankruptcy court was "persuaded by 
[his] opinion that the Keogh plan may not be a qualified plah under IRC 401(a) because 
of the operational failures stated." (Add. B hereto, pp. 424/$-11.) 
Notwithstanding its findings regarding the nonqualified status of the alleged 
Keogh plan under § 401(a), the bankruptcy court determined that the plan nonetheless 
was "described in Section 401(a)" and, therefore, exempt. (Add. B hereto, p. 428/7-12.) 
Relying heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. E.E}. Pa. 1993) (wherein the court 
opined in dictum that the term "provided for under § 401(a)," as contained in 
Pennsylvania's exemption statute, was broader than "qualified under" § 401(a)), the 
9
 Mr. Lloyd did not testify regarding the Debtor's failure to cause the PC to adopt 
the Keogh plan in 1996. However, this operational defect also results in plan 
disqualification because his plan was no longer maintained! by an "employer" as required 
by § 401(a). See Rev. Rul. 67-3, 1967-1 CB 94 (A sole prqprietorship was converted to a 
partnership, but the partnership did not adopt the proprietorship plan nor establish a new 
plan. The plan could not, therefore, be considered a plan of the partnership and 
deductions for contributions to a qualified plan could not be claimed). 
7 
bankruptcy court here opined that the "described in" language used in Utah's exemption 
statute was broad enough to encompass funds in nonqualified plans. (Add. B hereto, p. 
428/7-12.) 
The Debtor has repeatedly argued that his plan was "described in" § 401(a) 
because he could correct plan defaults under the IRS' Employee Plans Compliance 
Resolution System ("EPCRS"). However, the bankruptcy court made no findings with 
respect to EPCRS. Further, it is undisputed that the Debtor has never attempted to take 
advantage of EPCRS. 
The Trustee's June 15, 2000 objection to the exemption gave the Debtor notice 
that his plan "may not be qualified under applicable law." (Aplt. App. DLG00013.) 
Also, more than a year before trial, the Debtor was advised of the specifics of his plan's 
operational defaults, through Mr. Lloyd's expert reports (DLG00150-00178), the 
Trustee's hearing brief (DLG00062-00077), and the Pretrial Order (DLG00015-00026). 
Despite this notice and Mr. Lloyd's testimony that most, if not all, of the operational 
defaults in the Debtor's plan were correctable under EPCRS (Aplt. App. DLG00228-
DLG00229, pp. 126/15-127/25), the Debtor did nothing prior to trial, and has done 
nothing since, to attempt to correct the defaults in his plan. He has also never explained, 
either at trial or on appeal, his reasons for not attempting to use EPCRS. 
Regarding EPCRS, Mr. Lloyd explained that based on the nature of the defaults, 
the Debtor would be unable to use Self Correction Procedures ("SCP") (where a taxpayer 
simply fixes the problem and no notice to the IRS is required). Instead, the Debtor would 
be required to use the more formal Voluntary Correction Procedures ("VCP") (where a 
8 
taxpayer must admit the default to the IRS, pay a fee, and obtain approval of remedial 
measures to be taken). (Aplt. App. DLG00231-00233, pp. 129/20-131/10). See also 
Rev. Proc. 2006-27 § 10,1.R.B. 2006-22. 
In addition, Mr. Lloyd testified that with respect to the Debtor's failure to include 
his wife, Janet, in the plan and to make contributions on her behalf, the Debtor would 
have had to pay into the plan amounts sufficient to (1) make up for the missing 
contributions and (2) account for any missing earnings on tfyose contributions. Mr. Lloyd 
estimated that the total of those amounts could be $30,000. (Aplt. App. DLG00248-
00251.) With respect to all of the plan's operational default^, in order to use the VCP the 
Debtor would have had to admit that his plan was in violation of §401(a) on the Petition 
Date. (Aplt. App. DLG00230/6-14, 00202/8-13.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENfT 
The district court and bankruptcy court erroneously interpreted the Utah 
exemption statute. Under the plain language of that statute,| its legislative history (and the 
plain language of 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)), the only Keogh plan$ "described in Section 
401(a)" are qualified plans. Contrary to the bankruptcy court's interpretation of In re 
Kaplan, supra, that case ultimately held that the similar Pennsylvania statute (which 
exempts plans "provided for under" Section 401(a)) only exempts plans that are 
"qualified under" Section 401(a). 
The bankruptcy court and district court apparently fetlt that the Debtor's violations 
in operating the plan were not serious ones so it did not matter whether the plan was 
9 
qualified. However, these violations were serious enough to disqualify the plan as of the 
Petition Date, as the Tenth Circuit determined, which is all that matters. 
Either the Debtor's plan was qualified on the Petition Date or it was not. Because 
it was not qualified, it is not a plan described in § 401(a). Any other approach does not 
work, especially where there are no meaningful standards to be applied in determining 
what operational defaults might be tolerated under the Utah statute. 
Thus, this Court should determine that the Debtor's nonqualified Keogh plan is 
not a plan "described in" § 401(a), within the meaning of the Utah exemption statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A KEOGH PLAN THAT DOES NOT MEET THE 
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 401(a) 
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS NOT A PLAN 
"DESCRIBED IN" SECTION 401(a) 
The issue of Utah law certified to this Court requires no analysis concerning the 
Debtor's plan, why it is not qualified, or whether it could be fixed. The issue the Tenth 
Circuit certified, notwithstanding the Debtor's motion to reconsider, is simply whether 
the Utah legislature intended to exempt nonqualified Keogh plans. Based on the plain 
language of the Utah statute, its legislative history, as well as the ultimate interpretation 
of the similar Pennsylvania exemption statute in In re Kaplan, supra, the answer is no. 
10 
A. Statutory Language 
To interpret a statute, a court looks first to its plain language. In re Kunz, 2004 UT 
71,1| 8, 99 P.3d 793 (quoting Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 1|84 (Utah 1998)).10 If the 
court finds a provision ambiguous, it then seeks guidance fr0m the legislative history and 
relevant policy considerations. Id. (quoting/ft re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 
1996)). 
In general, courts are to construe exemption statutes l|iberally in favor of debtors. 
Id (quoting Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan, 325 P.2d 908, 9D9-10 (Utah 1958)). 
However, "'liberal construction' is not a license . . . for the 0ourt to enlarge an exemption 
or read into it provisions that are not found there." In re Hodes, 308 B.R. 61, 65-66 (10 
Cir. BAP 2004) affd, 402 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2005); see also PIE. Employees Federal 
Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988) (liberal construction of 
homestead exemption statutes "should not be used to protect debtors from the 
performance of'just obligations' . . . [Hjomestead exemption statutes 'must be construed 
and interpreted to give effect to the purposes and objects . .,. the Legislature had in mind 
in the enactments."5) (citations omitted) 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
78-23-5. Property exempt from execution. 
(l)(a) An individual is entitled to exemption §f the following 
property: 
When interpreting state law, a federal court's "dutly is to determine . . . what the 
state law is and to apply it" and to refrain from "substituting] [its] own policy choices for 
those of the state legislature." In re Rubarts, 896 F.2d 107, 115 (5th Cir. 1990). 
11 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any 
money or other assets held for or payable to the individual as 
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan 
or arrangement that is described in Section 401(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended; 
The bankruptcy court used a "plain reading" analysis of former § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) 
to determine that, by use of the phrase "described in" instead of "qualified under," "the 
Utah exemption statute does not require that for a plan to be exempt, it must be qualified 
under 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code." (Add. B hereto, pp. 427/25-428/2). The 
error in that analysis is that under the plain language of the Utah exemption statute, a plan 
described in § 401(a) must necessarily be a plan that meets all the requirements to be a 
qualified plan under § 401(a). 
Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code is entitled "Qualified pension, profit-
sharing, and stock bonus plans." 26 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added). Subsection (a) of 
§401 is entitled "Requirements for qualification," and contains multiple subsections 
delineating the qualification requirements for pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus 
plans. Id 
It follows that, for a plan to be described in § 401(a), it must be a plan that is a 
qualified plan under § 401(a). To interpret the statute to include plans not operated 
12 
within the requirement of § 401(a), and therefore not qualified under § 401(a), makes the 
reference to § 401(a) meaningless. 
B. Legislative History 
During closing argument in the bankruptcy court, the Debtor suggested that the 
Utah legislature included the "described in" language in a specific effort to broaden the 
scope of the exemption beyond qualified plans. (Aplt. App. DLG00267-00270, pp. 
375/17-378/17.) The bankruptcy court did not appear to rely on this alleged legislative 
history in its "plain reading" analysis. Nevertheless, the actual legislative history is 
instructive. 
The Utah legislature enacted § 78-23-5 in 1981, and ^mended it in 1989, 1997, 
and 1999. " The 1989 amendment introduced retirement plans to the list of exempt 
property and added the "described in" language. The Trusted could not locate any 
legislative history explaining the legislature's choice of the words "described in" as 
opposed to "qualified under." However, participants in the Senate and House floor 
11
 See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted): 
The court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to 
give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. Generally, the best 
indication of that intent is the statute's plain language. Thus, the court will 
interpret a statute according to its plain language, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express 
purpose of the statute. In addition, statutory enactments are to be so 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and 
interpretations are to be avoided which render some £art of a provision 
nonsensical or absurd. 
12
 The 1997 amendment inserted § 408 in the list of Internal Revenue Code 
sections, and made other relatively minor changes to the statute. The 1999 amendment 
inserted 408A in the string of sections. (Aplt. App. DLG00179-00180.) 
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debates, while not directly addressing the issue of "described in" versus "qualified 
under," repeatedly used the word "qualified" when referring to plans falling within the 
scope of the amendment. 
For example, Senate sponsor Fred Finlinson stated the following: 
[A]t this point our exempt list does not identify the things that 
the federal income tax laws have said are exempt from 
creditors. Senate Bill 12 brings into our bankruptcy law a 
consistency with the federal taxation law. So what it would do 
is say to an individual participant in a qualified plan, that in 
the event that he took out bankruptcy, that the benefits of his 
qualified pension plan would not be available for creditors. 
That would preserve the integrity of the qualified pension 
plan, and it would make our bankruptcy treatment consistent 
with the federal law. 
48th Gen. Sess. (Jan. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Finlinson) (starts at 24 min. 36 sec.) 
(emphasis added). (An audio recording of the legislative history is contained in Aplt. 
App.DLG00281.) 
In addition, Representative Lunt stated the following in his presentation of the bill 
to the House: 
Under the current situation there is a conflict that exists 
between the federal bankruptcy law and the federal law 
governing pensions known as ERISA. Now, the ERISA 
pension provisions provide that benefits are protected from 
creditors. These benefits would be under the qualified plans 
of certain annuities, the qualified plans that come under the 
Internal Revenue Code of Section 401(a). They may not be 
attached or levied on or sold by creditors. However, in the 
State of Utah, the bankruptcy courts have ruled that because 
the Utah law does not exempt these pensions, that a pension 
can be sold by a trustee in bankruptcy. This raises serious 
problems for pensions and for pension plan trustees. By 
amending the Utah Exemptions Act to include the retirement 
benefits as exempt property, the current conflict between the 
federal laws can be eliminated . . . . These laws have been 
14 
enacted in other states. I think they are supported universally 
by pension administrators and those folks who ^re involved in 
the administration and participation in these qualified plans. 
It's very important to make sure that the federal law of 
bankruptcy as applied by the bankruptcy courts in the state of 
Utah is consistent with the ERISA provisions. ky including 
pensions under exempt property in the State of Utah, this 
would automatically clear up the confliction thp.t exists 
because of the nonconformity with the bankruptcy law, as it's 
applied in Utah, and the ERISA provision. 
48th Gen. Sess. (Jan. 30, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lunt) (starts at 0 minutes 31 seconds) 
(emphasis added). (An audio recording of the legislative history is contained in Aplt. 
App. DLG00282.) 
While the legislators did not discuss the use of "described in" versus "qualified 
under," their frequent reference to qualified plans indicates ijheir intent that the exemption 
apply only to Keogh plans that are qualified under IRC §40\(a)u Moreover, the 
legislature's purpose in amending the exemption statute to include retirement plans 
"described in" various Internal Revenue Code sections was to bring consistency between 
federal tax law and Utah exemption laws—not to provide a state exemption for money 
contributed to Keogh plans that are not qualified under federal law. 
As argued before the district court (Aplt. App. DLG0O38O-OO385), the Trustee 
submits that the most probable reason the legislature chose ^'described in" as opposed to 
"qualified under" is because of the ten Internal Revenue Cqde sections referenced in 
13
 Contrary to the Debtor's argument at p. 12, n. 2 of his Tenth Circuit brief, the 
issue is not why the legislature chose that term, but what it (meant by that term. The 
above quoted legislative intent unequivocally shows that th^ legislature intended to 
exempt only those Keogh plans that were qualified under § 401(a). Hence, the legislature 
intended to give "described in" the same meaning as "qualified under," at least as applied 
to Keogh plans and other plans covered by § 401(a). 
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former § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x). Some of those sections deal with qualified retirement plans 
and some do not. 
For example, Section 408 is an IRA, which is an investment vehicle recognized by 
the IRS. Section 408(a) is a Roth IRA. Section 414(d) is a government plan. Section 
414(e) is a church plan. Section 401(k) is a deferred compensation arrangement. It 
would not have made sense to require that each of the plans or investment vehicles 
referred to in the statute be "qualified," where there is no qualification mechanism for 
some of them.14 
Hence the legislature chose the words "described in" rather than "qualified under." 
Again, however, the only Keogh plans "described in" § 401(a) are qualified plans. 
C. Exemption Law in Other States 
Most states with exemption statutes like the Utah statute use the term "qualified 
under."15 Courts construing these statutes uniformly hold that nonqualified plans are not 
14
 The Trustee made this same argument at pp. 18-19 of his opening brief in the 
Tenth Circuit. Debtor made no attempt to rebut that argument in his Tenth Circuit brief. 
15
 See e.g., Plunk v. Yaquinto (In re Plunk), 481 F.3d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(analyzing § 42.0021 of the Texas Property Code, which exempts plans that "qualify 
under" the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code); In re Goldschein, 244 
B.R. 595, 602-03 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (analyzing Maryland's exemption statute, 
Maryland Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 11-504(h), which includes a retirement plan 
"qualified under" § 401(a)); In re Lawrence, supra, 235 B.R. at 498 (analyzing Florida's 
exemption statute, Fla. Stat. § 222.21(2), which exempts plans "qualified under" 
§ 401(a)). 
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exempt. Utah and a few other states use language other th^n "qualified under." The 
only court decision that the Trustee (or the Debtor) has found which interprets an 
exemption statute that does not use the term "qualified undeif" is In re Kaplan, supra. 
In support of its "plain reading" analysis, the bankruptcy court relied on, but 
misconstrued, the holding in Kaplan. There, the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court 
interpreted Pennsylvania's exemption statute, which exempts from attachment or 
execution on a judgment "[a]ny retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 
401(a). . . ." Kaplan, 162 B.R. at 689 (emphasis added). 
In Kaplan, the court "observe[d] that the language of|[the Pennsylvania exemption 
statute] is very broad, and that it appears to have been drafted to include even plans 
i 0 
which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its scope." \d. at 697. The court, 
however, ultimately determined that the exempt status of th? debtor's plan depended 
precisely on the plan's qualification under the IRC: 
We have not been asked to, and therefore did 
any sort of determination regarding the IRC 
Debtor's plan. . . . If the IRS should rule, in 
not, purport to make 
qualification of the 
tpe future, that the Plan 
16 held not exempt" because the 
Cfoldschein, supra, 244 B.R. at 
exempt because the debtor 
ee, as a beneficiary and 
, supra, 235 B.R. at 510 (the 
Exempt). 
See Plunk, supra, 481 F.3d at 304 (pension plan 
debtor's misuse of plan assets disqualified the plan); In re 
602-03 (retirement plan was disqualified and, therefore, not] 
violated the plan provisions by including his wife, a non-employ 
by obtaining improper loans from the plan); In re Lawrence^ 
plan did not qualify under § 401(a) and, therefore, was not 
17
 See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124 (Pennsylvania's exemption statute including "[a]ny 
retirement or annuity fund provided for under section 401(a). . ."); Hawaii Rev. Stat. 
§651-124 (Hawaii's exemption statute including "a plan or| arrangement described in 
section 401(a)..."). 
l o 
In his Tenth Circuit brief, the Debtor appears to l^ ave characterized this portion 
of the Kaplan decision as its holding, when it is actually dictum. 
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is not tax qualified under the IRC, it would appear that the Plan 
would be of limited use to the Debtor. Furthermore, were the Plan 
disqualified under the IRC, it would appear inequitable for us to 
preclude [the objecting creditor] from ever reaching the funds 
contained in it. For this reason, we condition the future effect of our 
ruling that the Plan is exempt on the Plan's continuing qualification. 
. .. If the IRS intervenes at a later date and disqualifies the Plan, 
then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude the 
Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from 
claims of the Debtor's creditors. 
Id. (emphasis added).19 
Thus, as shown by the language quoted above, here the bankruptcy court's 
construction of the holding in Kaplan as merely "that the debtor's plan was exempt under 
the Pennsylvania exemption statute" (Add. B hereto, p. 427/19-21) is incomplete and 
erroneous. Notwithstanding that the phrase "provided for under" was different from 
"qualified under," the Kaplan court recognized that to be a plan "provided for under 
section 401(a)," the plan needed to be one that was qualified under § 401(a). The same is 
19
 This portion of the Kaplan decision was the actual outcome of the case (which 
the Debtor mischaracterized as "dicta" at p. 11 of his Tenth Circuit brief). While Kaplan 
tied the above-quoted "condition" to whether or not the IRS subsequently disqualified the 
plan, it did so only because, unlike the bankruptcy court here, it was not asked to 
determine, and therefore did not determine, whether the plan there was qualified. Thus, 
the proper reading of Kaplan is that the "provided for" language in the Pennsylvania 
exemption statute, which is not materially different than the "described in" language of 
the Utah exemption statute, was intended to mean the same as "qualified under" § 401(a) 
of the Internal Revenue Code which, after all, is a tax qualification statute. Moreover, 
had the Kaplan court been asked to determine the tax qualification issue, as the 
bankruptcy court here was asked to do, it would have been proper for Kaplan to do so, as 
the bankruptcy court here did. See Plunk, supra, 481 F.3d at 307 (bankruptcy court has 
jurisdiction to determine whether a pension plan is qualified, and therefore exempt, based 
upon disqualifying event that occurs after the IRS has last determined that the plan is 
qualified). 
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true here. To be a plan "described in" § 401(a) under the Utfrh exemption statute, the 
Debtor's alleged Keogh plan must have been a plan qualified under § 401(a).20 
II. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT "^ESCRIBED IN" 
MEANS SOMETHING LESS THAN "QUALIFIED UNDER" 
SECTION 401(a), IT SHOULD EXPLAIN WHAT 
"DESCRIBED IN" MEANS 
Aside from opining that "described in" is broader thap "qualified under" (Add. B 
hereto, pp. 428/22-429/1), the bankruptcy court did not define what it thought "described 
in" meant. The bankruptcy court further did not explain wh^t facts it relied on to 
determine that the Debtor's nonqualified plan fell within th0 Utah statute. 
90 
At p. 11, n. 1 of his Tenth Circuit brief, Reinhart Argued that ". . . many courts 
be tax qualified in order to be 
However, as the cases 
have held that an ERISA qualified retirement plan need not 
excluded from the bankruptcy estate." (Citations omitted.) 
Reinhart cites in support of that proposition make clear, that is a different issue than the 
exemption issue before this court. Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), a debtor's retirement 
plan that contains a spendthrift or anti-alienation provision Enforceable under 
nonbankruptcy law (including ERISA) is not included as property of the debtor's estate 
Such provisions are enforceable under ERISA, but only if tljiere are more participants in 
the plan than just the debtor (and the debtor's spouse). See) Raymond B. Yates, M.D., 
P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 21 and n. 6 (2004). Because Reinhart is 
the only participant in his plan, it is included as property of Ithe estate, which would also 
be true even if the plan covered his wife, as it was required, but failed, to do. Id. 
Typically, a court would not even reach the exemption issuE, until it determined that the 
pension plan was property of the estate. (Add. B hereto, Aplt. App. DLG00044/5-13.) 
Here, Reinhart never contended in the bankruptcy court tha); his plan was excluded from 
the estate, and the bankruptcy court (correctly) found that tljie plan was property of the 
estate. (Add. B hereto, Aplt. App. DLG00044/5-00046/4.) Thus, the exemption issue 
was the issue before the bankruptcy court, the district courtj and the Tenth Circuit, and is 
the issue before this Court, not whether the Keogh plan wa$ property of the estate. 
21
 In his briefs in the district court (Aplt. App. DLGf)0306-00325) and in the 
Tenth Circuit, the Debtor similarly failed to define the degree to which a plan can be set 
up and/or operated outside of the requirements of § 401(a) tad still be a plan "described 
in" § 401(a). 
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Obviously, there must be some relationship between a plan that is "described in" 
§ 401(a) and a plan that is set up and operated according to the requirements of § 401(a). 
However, without the bankruptcy court or district court having defined what that 
relationship is, it presently stands as an "I know it when I see it" proposition. That is an 
unacceptable interpretation of the Utah exemption statute. 
Thus, if this Court determines that "described in" means something less than 
"qualified under" § 401(a), it should explain the standards for determining what 
"described in" means by reference to the facts of this case. For example, the Court 
should answer the following questions: 
1. Whether the Debtor's plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the 
Debtor was required to have the plan cover all eligible employees (Aplt. App. 
DLG00208/16-19; Add. B hereto, p. 420/3-4) but the plan did not cover the Debtor's 
wife, Janet, (a) who was the only other eligible employee besides the Debtor, (b) who 
requested that the Debtor (who was the plan administrator) include her as a plan 
participant, but (c) who, nevertheless, was never included as a participant and thus never 
received any of the mandatory or discretionary contributions provided for under the 
plan.22 [Aplt. App. DLG00017-19, % 4k, 1, v, w, x, y, z, aa, DLG00191-00199 (Tr. 89/23-
92/8), DLG00275-00280).] 
This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in" 
§ 401(a) where the Debtor caused the plan to exclude from coverage 50% of eligible 
employees for 100% of the plan years prior to the Petition Date. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 401(a)(3) [a plan is "qualified" if "the plan of which such trust is a part satisfies the 
requirements of section 410 (relating to minimum participation standards). . . ."]; see 
also Myron v. United States, 550 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1977) (plan of two corporations 
disqualified where sole shareholder failed to include 5 employees who were eligible for 
20 
2. Whether the plan is "described in" § 40 Ka) where (a) the Debtor 
ceased to be self employed and became an employee of the PC in January, 1996, (b) the 
Debtor thereafter caused the PC to continue making contributions on the Debtor's behalf 
as if he remained self employed, and (c) the Debtor did not cftuse the PC to adopt and 
restate the plan as a corporate pension plan until August 16, £001 (more than a year and a 
half after the Petition Date, and after the Trustee had filed hi$ objection).23 (Aplt. App. 
DLGOOO 16-00017,14a, e5 f, g, h, DLGOOO 18, ^ 4p, q, DLG00141-00149; Add. B hereto, 
pp. 417/14-418/1.) 
3. Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, under the money 
purchase plan component, the Debtor was required to make contributions of 10% of each 
participant's annual compensation, but failed to do so.24 [Aplt. App. DLG00100, 
DLG00122, §§ 3.1(b) and (d).] 
4. Whether the plan is "described in" § 4011(a) where the Debtor 
disregarded that plan requirement that contributions be made exclusively through Schwab 
1 
coverage but not included as participants); cf In re Goldseke in, supra (plan disqualified, 
and therefore not exempt, because debtor, who was principal in company, caused his 
wife, a non-employee, to be included as a beneficiary in the) company pension plan, and 
because the debtor obtained loans from the plan in violation of plan restrictions). 
2j
 This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in" 
§ 401(a) where for four of the last seven plan years before tne Petition Date, the Debtor 
caused 100% of the contributions to be made for his benefit to a plan not adopted or 
maintained by his employer. A "qualified" plan under § 401(a) must be one that is 
established and maintained by the "employer." 26 U.S.C. § 401. As discussed above, a 
plan established and maintained by a person other than an employer is not a qualified 
plan. 
24
 This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is "described in" 
§ 401(a) where the Debtor made 0% of the required contributions to the money purchase 
plan for four of the last seven plan years before the Petition Date. 
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as the plan "custodian" [Id. at 3.1(d)], and the Debtor directed investments through 
himself as the self-designated "trustee" of the plan, including a $10,400 contribution to 
fund the Parker Loan. (Aplt. App. DLG 00018, ^ 4u, DLG00101-00112.) 
5. Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, for the year 
2000, the Debtor caused contributions to be made of $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum 
contribution limits under § 415 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code.25 (Aplt. App. 
DLG00100, DLG00136-00140, DLG00177-00178.) 
6. Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the bankruptcy 
court found it to be "operationally in default" on the Petition Date. (Add. B hereto, p. 
428/13-14.) See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-l(b)(3) ("The law is concerned not only with the form 
of the plan but also with its effects in operation."); Cornell-Young Co. v. U.S., 469 F.2d 
1318, 1324 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he law looks not only to the form of the plan but also to 
its operation") (citation omitted). 
7. Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where the Debtor failed 
to use EPCRS to correct the plan's operational defaults prior to the Petition Date (or 
ever), and exemptions are determined as of the Petition Date (In re Rowe, supra), 
notwithstanding Internal Revenue Code provisions permitting retroactive cure of plan 
disqualification {In re Lawrence, supra). 
This question could also be phrased as whether the plan is described in § 401(a) 
where for the plan year immediately preceding the Petition Date, 100% of that year's 
contributions were unauthorized. 
26
 Mr. Lloyd consistently testified that, under IRS policies and procedures, a 
successful use of EPCRS does not provide a retroactive change to a plan's disqualified 
status. Rather, it "is merely an agreement between the plan sponsor and the IRS that the 
22 
8. Whether the plan is "described in" § 401(a) where, under EPCRS, 
the Debtor would have had to use the VCP rather than the SOP, and thereby admit that 
the plan was in default on the Petition Date, pay a compliance fee, fund approximately 
$30,000 with respect to the default regarding the failure to in|clude Janet in the plan, and 
obtain IRS approval of remedial measures taken. (Aplt. App. DLG00231-00233, pp. 
129/20-131/10, DLG00248-00251.) See also Rev. Proc. 2006-27 § 10,1.R.B. 2006-22. 
The Trustee submits that there are no meaningful standards that could be applied 
to determine that the Debtor's nonqualified Keogh plan is nonetheless "described in" 
§ 401(a), within the meaning of the Utah exemption statute, based on the facts of this 
case. 
IRS will not impose the sanction, the tax sanctions that they iwould otherwise be allowed 
to impose because of the plan failures and operation." (Apllj. App. DLG00233, p. 
131/11-19.) 
Also, the effects under EPCRS are limited. More specifically, EPCRS "ha[s] no effect 
on the rights of any party under any other law, including Title I of ERISA." Rev. Proc. 
2006-27 § 6.12,1.R.B. 2006-22. Accordingly, the rights of me Trustee and creditors for 
turnover of the funds in the Debtor's unqualified Keogh plan as of the Petition Date 
would not be affected by later correction of plan defaults under EPCRS. 
On pp. 15-16 of his Tenth Circuit Brief, the Debtor argued that his operational 
defaults were correctable post-petition. However, the cases the Debtor cited at pp. 15-16 
of his Tenth Circuit brief do not support his argument. His quote from In re Copulos, 
210 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1997), reversed in part on other grounds, First Indem of 
Am Ins Co v Copulos, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6672 (D. NJ. February 24. 1998) is 
dictum, because the court determined that the plan there wai tax qualified. The post-
petition plan amendment in In re Rosenbloom, 132 B.R. 970, 972 (S.D. Fla. 1991) was 
administrative only and did not affect qualification. In re Baker, 195 B.R 386, 393 
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996), atfd, 114 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 1997) does not suggest that the 
absence of an IRS disqualification decision, by itself, requires a bankruptcy court to 
determine that a plan is tax qualified. To the contrary, see Plunk, supra. The other 
argument the Debtor made on p. 16 of his Tenth Circuit bri^f, that the Trustee seeks 
different treatment of the Debtor's plan based on his bankruptcy status, is also 
unsupported. Because the plan is not protected by the Utah exemption statute, the 
Debtor's creditors can reach it. The Trustee merely stands in the shoes of those creditors. 
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CONCLUSION 
As shown above, in interpreting the Utah exemption statute as exempting Keogh 
plans that are not qualified under § 401(a), the bankruptcy court and district court ignored 
the plain language of the statute and its legislative history and misconstrued the Kaplan 
decision interpreting a similar Pennsylvania exemption statute. The bankruptcy court and 
district court also substituted their judgment for that of the legislature, by adopting some 
undefined (and undefinable) approach that while certain plan defaults are serious enough 
to disqualify a Keogh Plan for tax purposes, they are not serious enough to disqualify a 
plan for exemption purposes. There is no reasoned support for such an approach. 
This Court should determine that because the Debtor's alleged Keogh plan was not 
qualified on the Petition Date, as the Tenth Circuit determined, the plan was not a plan 
"described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, within the meaning of former Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (l)(a)(x) (2000), and, therefore, was not exempt. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2010. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
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24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of May, 2010,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, to be served by U.S. first-class mail 
postage pre-paid, to each of the following recipients: 
Duane H. Gillman Steven R. Bailejy 
Michael F. Thomson 2454 Washington Blvd. 
Durham Jones & Pinegar Ogden, Utah 84401 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
G \Jab\GLadwell\Supreme Court\Appellant s Bnef4 16 10 docx 
25 
Tab A 
The below described is SIGNED. 
Dated: June 08, 2008 
ve* **«*/-,. 
l/uiAu^3.7^ut^t'^ 
WILLIAM T. THURMAN 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge «*>/-, W« tfO* 
Steven R. Bailey, #0174 
2454 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone; (801) 621-4430 
Attorney for Debtor 
Duane H. Gillman #1194 
Michael F. Thomson #9707 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 415-3000 
Attorneys for Debtor 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re 
DOUGLAS JAMES RELNHART, 
Debtor. 
Banljxuptcy Case Number 
00-20995 WTT 
[Chapter 7] 
ORDER ON TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS 
The matter of the Trustee's Objection to Exemptions, filed in this case on June 15, 2000 
(the "Objection"), which concerned the Debtor's claimed exemption in and to funds held in the 
Debtor's "Keogh" plan (the "Funds"), came on for trial on the 1$*, 14th, and 15th days of May, 
2008, before the Honorable William T. Thurman, United States Bankniptcy Judge. The Debtor 
appeared in person and was represented by Duane H- Gillman ahd Michael F. Thomson of 
SLC 202U7.1 
10th Cif. Aplt App 
DLG00027 
Filed: 05/21/08 DLG APP0016 
Durham Jones & Pinegar. The Trustee was represented by Adam S. Affleck and Andrew B. 
Clawson of Prince Yeates & Geldzahler. 
The Court, having judged the credibility of the witnesses, having considered the 
documents admitted into evidence, and having heard the arguments of counsel, rendered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Based on such findings and conclusions, 
which are incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Objection is OVERRULED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
5(l)(a)(x) (2000); and it is further 
ORDERED that the Objection is SUSTAINED pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
5(l)(b)(2) (2000) as to $20,400.00 of the Funds; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Funds are exempt, except for $20,400.00 of the Funds; and it is 
further 
ORDERED that a separate turnover order shall be entered requiring the Debtor to 
turnover $20,400.00 of the Funds to the Trustee; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court reserves the right to supplement its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and this Order with a written opinion at a later time. 
END OF D O CUMENT 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2008, 2:36 P.M. 
* * * * * 
(Call to Order of the Court) 
THE COURT: Good afternoon. Thank you for your 
patience with the Court. I thought we'd be ready to go at 
2:00 o'clock. We did a couple of more edits and found a 
couple of typos, and I hope I don't make some grammatical 
errors when we read this into the record, but I appreciate 
your attendance here. 
Just for the record, this is the third day of our trial 
in this contested matter in the Reinhart case, and I would 
just like the record to identify that we have parties here. 
Could you just state your names on the record. Let's go 
over here first. 
MR. CLAWSON: Andrew Clawson and Adam Affleck on behalf 
of the Trustee. 
MR. GILLMAN: Duane Gillman and Michael Thompson on 
behalf of Dr. Reinhart. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The matter before the 
Court in this contested matter is brought under the 
Bankruptcy Code 11 USC 522 B and interpretation of Utah Code 
78-23-5-1 (a) (x) 2000, year 2000, to determine the exemption 
of property claimed by the Debtor Douglas James Reinhart, 
referred to as "the debtor" throughout this decision, as 
opposed to the Trustee, David Gladwell, who I refer to as 
10thCir.Aplt.App. 
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"the Trustee" in this decision. And it's n^y obligation to 
determine if property's exempt in this estate. 
The Court has conducted a three-day tjrial on this on 
May 13, 14 and today, the 15th. The parties appeared and 
presented evidence, and I received their oiral arguments and 
have reviewed all their submissions, and I have reviewed 
those and I've made my own conclusion and £one our own 
research to determine the matters before the Court, and 
based upon those, the Court makes the following findings and 
conclusions. 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this qourt. No one's 
really contested that. And I find that jurisdiction is 
appropriate in this contested matter pursuant to 28 USC 1334 
and 157(b) (2) . The Court specifically fii^ds that this is 
subject to the Court's core jurisdiction \lnder 28 USC 
157(b)(2)1. Venue is appropriate under 1409(a). Notice is 
deemed appropriate for this trial in all Respects. Let's 
see. I should have said 1408. 1408(a) vinue is 
appropriate. Notice of the hearing is appropriate in all 
respects. 
The debtor filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy on 
January 28, 2000, by filing a petition on that date which 
initiated a Chapter 7 case. On May 16, 2000, the debtor 
filed amended schedules claiming an exemption under Utah 
Code 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) 2000 in property described as a Keogh 
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which then had a market value of $306,000, according to the 
schedules. On June 15, 2000, the Trustee filed an 
objection, which I find was timely, objecting to the 
exemption. On September 5, 2006, the debtor filed amended 
schedules claiming the same exemption in the Keogh, but 
increasing -- but increased the market value of the 
exemption to $333,835.65. Sometimes I refer to that as the 
fund or the property in question as we go through this. 
From 1992 to the petition date, the debtor worked as an 
anesthesiologist in Ogden, Utah. From 1992 to December 31, 
1995, the debtor operated as a sole proprietor. On December 
6, 1992, the debtor, in his capacity as a sole proprietor, 
established a Charles Schwaub & Company -- I refer to that 
as Schwaub sometimes -- combination plan, or I sometimes 
refer to that as Keogh plan which is a Schwaub plan, that 
combines a money purchase plan, which 1 sometimes call MPP 
plan, and a profit sharing plan, and they were adopted by 
the same because he -- as he was the employer. 
The debtor was the plan administrator of the 
combination plan, but Schwaub was the plan custodian. The 
employee eligibility requirements for participation in the 
combination plan were zero years of service and 21 years of 
age. The vesting schedule for contributions to the 
combination plan were 100 percent vested immediately. The 
mandatory contribution rate for contributions to the MPP 
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plan portion of the combination plan was \L0 percent of the 
participant's salary. The debtor had always been a sole 
participant in -- has always been the sol^ participant in 
the combination plan for all times applicable. 
From 199 -- between 1992 and January 1, '96, the debtor 
made several contributions to the combination plan on behalf 
of himself. In '92 it was $5452 to the n^ oney purchase plan, 
4548 for the profit sharing for a total c}f $10,000. In 1993 
it was 13,489 to the money purchase plan, 16,511 to the 
profit sharing for a total of 30,000. Ir^  1994 14,740 to the 
money purchase plan, 15,260 for the profit sharing for a 
total of 30,000. In 1995 13,563 to the nfioney purchase plan 
and 3437 to the profit sharing plan for $ total of $17,000. 
On January 1, 1996, the debtor incotporated as the 
Douglas Reinhart, MD, PC. I sometimes r^fer to that as the 
PC as we go through this. From January 1, '96, to the 
petition date, the debtor was the sole shareholder and 
president of the PC. Upon incorporation of the PC on 
January 1, 1996, the debtor ceased to be an - to be 
self-employed, and became an employee of the PC. After the 
PC was incorporated, the debtor caused t^ ae PC to continue to 
make contributions to the combination pl^n. From 1996 
through the petition date neither the debtor nor the PC made 
any contributions to the MPP portion of the combination 
plan. The PC did not adopt the Schwaub retirement plan 
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until August 16, 2001. I pulled that from Exhibit K. 
On February 1, 2003, the PC amended the MPP plan 
effective December 31, 2003, to reduce the plan contribution 
rate to zero percent so that future benefits would cease to 
accrue in the plan as of that date and time, and the plan 
and all of its assets were to be merged into the Douglas J. 
Reinhart, MD, PC profit sharing plan effective December 31, 
2003. All that is derived from Exhibit L. 
At or around December 31, 1998, the PC issued Check No. 
1062 dated December 31, 1998, to make a $10,000 contribution 
to the profit sharing portion of the combination plan. This 
is from the Trustee's Exhibit 12. The drawee bank did not 
pay the Check No. 1062 until February 10, 1999. In other 
words, the check did not clear the PC's account until after 
the petition -- excuse me -- until that date, which was the 
December --or excuse me -- February 10, 1999. 
Additionally, two checks dated December 17, '99, Checks 
No. 1446 and 13 -- 1346 and 1347 in the amounts of $1,534.92 
and $8,865.08 respectfully, the debtor, one, caused the PC 
to contribute $10,400 to the Douglas J. Reinhart, MD, PC 
retirement plans, and, two, caused the Douglas J. Reinhart, 
MD, PC retirement plan to loan $10,400 to Colleen Parker, 
which I refer to as the Parker loan. All that is more 
particularly set forth in Trustee's Exhibit 14. 
The terms of the combination plan and the custodial 
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account agreement require that all contributions be made 
through the combination plan custodial account. The 
contribution of the Parker loan was not mac$e through the 
combination plan custodial account; however, the amount of 
the loan, when compared to the total amount of plan that is 
the subject to this contested matter, is approximately three 
percent of the total contributions. 
From 1993 to 1996, Janet Reinhart -- Sometimes I refer 
to her as Janet for convenience of the disctussion -- was 
employed by the debtor in his sole proprietor capacity. 
From 1996 to the petition date, Janet was employed by the PC 
as an employee. From 1993 to 2000, Janet teceived wages 
from the debtor either from --as the sole proprietor or an 
employee as the — from the PC as follows: 11,444, 1993; 
11,444, '94; 12,994, '95; 12,466 in «96; $X8,913 in '97; 
21,492 in l98; 20,633 in '99, and 11,845 ±i|i 2000. 
Janet was over the age of 21 in 1992, and met all the 
requirements to be a participant in the coifibination plan 
from the date of her employment to the dat^ of the petition. 
From 1993 to the date of petition, Janet w£s never made a 
participant in the combination plan. Additionally, no 
contributions to the combination plan were made on behalf of 
Janet during that time period. At the tri^JL on this matter, 
Janet testified that she did not recall haying any 
discussions with the debtor regarding the Combination plan. 
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She was not aware that she was entitled to participate in 
such a plan, and she never signed a waiver of participation 
in the plan. The plan documents of the combination plan did 
not permit exclusion of eligible employees. 
There are basically three issues before the Court that 
it must determine. First, whether the combination plan is 
exempt from the estate, or not included in the estate is a 
better way to phrase it under 541(c) (2) . Second, if the 
combination plan is property of the estate, whether the 
property is exempt under Utah Code 78-23-5 -1(a) (x) . Now, 
when I refer to that 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) , I'm referring to the 
code that was in effect in the year 2000, no amendment since 
then. And, three, whether the $10,000 check of December 31, 
'98, from the PC to the combination plan and the Parker loan 
in the amount of 10,400 should be deemed contributions made 
by or on behalf of the debtor within one year of the 
petition date. 
The burden of proving the subject property!s not exempt 
rests with the party objecting to the claimed exemption. 
That's under Rule 4003 and, also, the Doyle case which I 
pulled from the Northern District of Illinois. Once the 
objecting party has made a prima fascia case, the burden 
shifts to the debtor to prove that such property is excluded 
from the estate. Now, I flagged this for the parties 
yesterday. I don't know if you went and read it, but that!s 
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the Judge Bolden case. That's the Hahn case decided in 1992 
where she cites the BI Financial Services Group, Inc. case, 
a 9th Circuit case in 1998. And I hope [you enjoyed reading 
those cases that I gave you. 
I am going to find that the combination plan is 
property of the estate. Although the patrrties did not argue 
whether the funds in the combination are| property of the 
estate, the Court believes that the threshold issue that 
should be resolved before evaluating whether the funds may 
be exempt under Utah law is that. As the Supreme Court 
pointed out in Owen vs., Owen, "No property can be exempted 
and, thereby, immunized, however, unless it falls within the 
bankruptcy estate." So that wasn't reallly teed up. It 
seemed like both of you had made a presumption or assumption 
that this really wasn't an issue, but the debtor actually 
listed the Keogh as property of the estate and then exempted 
it. And so I was tempted -- I mean, I Was really tempted to 
go down the property of the estate analysis. That will be 
another day in another case. 
Section 541(a) (1) broadly defines v^ hat interests 
comprise property of the estate and defines that all legal 
or equitable interest of the debtor and {property as of 
commencement of the case. 541(c)(2), hc^ wever, excludes from 
the estate certain interest of the debtor and specifically 
states, "A restriction on a transfer of beneficial interest 
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of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under 
applicable law and bankruptcy law is enforceable in a 
bankruptcy case." 
In interpreting 541(c)(2), the Supreme Court, in 
Patterson vs. Shumate, concluded that the debtor's interest 
in an ARISA qualified retirement plan was excluded from 
property of the estate under 541(c) (2); however, the Supreme 
Court did not define the ARISA qualified. Since Patterson 
several Courts have struggled, as this Court has, in looking 
at this matter with the definition of ARISA qualified. Case 
of In re: Baker. And I think we picked that up by 
somebody's brief, but we did some more research and found 
that on a cross-reference on some other matters. In re: 
Baker out of the 7th Circuit decided by Judge Schwartz. 
Now, I find that a very interesting case. No one 
really made a big deal about that. Judge Schwartz is a very 
highly respected jurist around the country, ajid whenever I 
go to bankruptcy seminars and the like, they always have the 
John Schwartz Roundtable and judges at the NCBJ conferences 
go participate in the Schwartz roundtable, I think, out of 
respect of him and his decisions. 
But he decided and he stated that Courts have struggled 
defining ARISA qualified plans, and he cited two or three 
cases when he decided the Baker case, In re: Baker, the 
Bennett case out of Eastern District of New York, the Haines 
lOttiCir Aplt App 
DLG00045 
OLGAPP0 0 3 4 
4ZJ 
case out of the Eastern District of Virginia. Hall out of 
the Western District of Michigan, Serus o^ it of the District 
of Massachusetts. The Court can find no Controlling 
precedent on this issue in the lOthe Circuit. 
The Trustee argues that because of certain unremedied 
operational failures, the combination plah was not a 
qualified plan on the date of the petition- Specifically 
Trustee's expert, Wally Lloyd, testified ^he debtors' Keogh 
plan failed to be a qualified plan under IRC 401(a) because 
of certain operational failures. One, th£t the plan failed 
to cover the -- and provide benefits for all eligible 
employees; namely, Janet. Two, the debtor caused plan 
assets to be diverted into an impermissible investment when 
the debtor made a $10,400 loan to Mrs. Pairker. Three, for 
the plan year commencing January 1, 2000, the debtor caused 
the PC to make and allocate a contribution to the plan in 
excess of the limits of IRC 415(c) which was $1455.75 in 
excess of the cap. And, four, since 1996^ the debtor failed 
to make the required contributions of 10 percent of the 
participant's salary to the MPP plan despjlte the specific 
plan requirements to do so. And Exhibit t-- Debtor Exhibit 
KK spells that out. 
On the last point, Mr. Wally Lloyd testified that 
although there was an attempt to retroactively fix the MPP, 
no retroactive fixes were made, and he opened in his 
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opinion, in both his opinion letter and his supplement, that 
the plan was not qualified. Mr. Lloyd further testified 
that the -- all of these operational failures were remedial, 
however. He noted that employers such as the debtor are 
allowed to modify or make changes to their plans or rights 
such as benefits accrued, and participation cannot be taken 
away retroactively. 
The Court determines that Mr. Lloyd is a credible 
witness and is persuaded by Mr. Lloyd's opinion that the 
Keogh plan may not be a qualified plan under IRC 401(a) 
because of the operational failures stated. The Court, 
however, notes that there has been no evidence presented 
showing that the IRS has disqualified the plan, so we've got 
parties arguing about what the IRS is going to do, but the 
IRS is not a party. And I want to make it clear whatever 
our rule, it's not binding on someone who is not here today. 
Now, the Court again recognizes that neither party has 
argued whether or not the Keogh plan is property of the 
estate. It hears you both assume it is, and, indeed, the 
debtor's gone down that track. Accordingly, based upon the 
evidence presented and Mr. Lloyd's testimony, the Court 
determines that the Keogh plan is property of the estate 
under 541(a) for the purposes of this decision. And I think 
that's consistent what that the Supreme Court says I have to 
do in making a determination. It's a threshold question 
10th Cif Aptt App 
DLG00047 
OLGAPP0036 
425 
under Owen that I ought to make that finding. But, like I 
said, since neither one of you took a strong position or 
took a position that it wasn't property of the estate, I'm 
not going down that -- that trail. 
Although the plan is property of the estate, the Court 
determines it is exempt under Utah Code 78-23-5-1(a)(x). 
Since the Court has determined that the Keogh plan is 
property of the estate, the Court next will give its 
analysis of why it's exempt under Utah law. The Court 
recognizes that it must "Construe exemption statutes 
liberally in favor of the debtor to protect him and his 
family from hardship," as stated by the Utal^  Supreme Court 
in the case of In re: Kuntz which has been edited to the 
Court. Under Utah Code 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) , "Ai^  individual is 
entitled to an exemption of the money or other assets held 
for or payable to an individual as a participant or 
beneficiary from or an interest of an individual as a 
participant or beneficiary in a retirement pjlan or an 
arrangement that is described in Section 40i(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986." 
The Trustee recognizes that certain property that is 
held in a retirement plan described in Section 401(a) of the 
IRC is exempt under Utah law; however, the ifrustee argues 
that the plan under 401(a) must be a qualified plan in order 
to be exempt. Under Utah law the Trustee then concludes 
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that it follows that a plan that is described in 401(a) 
would necessarily be qualified under 401(a). 
The debtor, on the other hand, argues that there 
is a distinction between the term described in and the term 
qualified, and the debtor asserts that the Trustee wants to 
amend the Utah exemption statute to get rid of the term 
described in. That's the -- that was Mr. Gillman's closing 
argument yesterday. The debtor further argues that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate did not 
determine qualified, hence, the Utah Legislature, in 
drafting 78-23-5-1(a)(x), elected to abandon the term 
qualified and adopted a much broader term of described in. 
The Court finds the reasoning and the ruling of In 
re: Kaplan, cited by the parties from the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, particularly instructive. In Kaplan the 
Court considered whether the debtor's pension plan and IRA 
account were exempt under Pennsylvania's exemption statute. 
The statute, in relevant part, states, "Any retirement or 
annuity fund provided for under 4 01(a) the IRC of 1986 shall 
be exempt from attachment or execution," Thatfs the 
Pennsylvania statute. "A creditor objected to the debtor's 
claimed exemption arguing that in order for the Pennsylvania 
exemption statute to apply, the plan had to be a 
tax-qualified plan provided for under IR" -- "under the 
Internal Revenue Code. " That' s a quote from the Kaplan case 
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as well. In support of its position, the creditor cited 
several cas&s which show that the plans losft their 
tax-qualified status due to violations of t^ ie Internal 
Revenue Code. 
The Kaplan Court denied the creditor's objection 
to the claimed exemption and actually overruled the 
objection holding that, "The specific langiiage of the 
Pennsylvania exemption statute issue does riot provide that a 
retirement fund to be exempt must arise frc^ m a qualified 
plan." The Court went on to point out that^ , Neither the 
word qualified nor the word plan appear anywhere in the 
legislation. Rather, the statute provides for an exemption 
for a fund provided for under sections of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The Court explained the language used in the 
Pennsylvania exemption statute was broader than the statutes 
at issue in the cases cited by the creditor. The Kaplan 
Court further noted that the Pennsylvania exemption statute 
was, "Drafted to include even plans which kre not 
technically tax qualified within its scope|. " The Court 
concluded that the debtor • s plan was exempt under the 
Pennsylvania exemption statute. 
As in Kaplan, the Court determines that the Utah 
exemption statute codified in 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) is similar to 
the broad language of the Pennsylvania exemption statute. 
The Utah exemption statute does not require that for a plan 
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to be exempt, it must be qualified under 401(a) of the 
j. Internal Revenue Code. In fact, like the Pennsylvania 
exemption statute, the word qualified does not appear 
anywhere in 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) . The Court believes that there 
are some merit to the use of the word described in as 
opposed to the use of the word qualified in the Utah 
statute. Given the broad language of 78-23-5-1(a) (x) , the 
Court finds that the Keogh plan, while arguably not tax 
qualified, is, nonetheless, described in Section 401(a). 
Accordingly, the Court finds that based upon the plain 
reading of 78-23-5-l(a) (x) , the debtor's Keogh plan is 
exempt. 
The Court further notes that there are several 
areas where the plan was operationally in default. In fact, 
Mr. Lloyd talked about that. The Court recognized that 
these operational failures should be corrected; however, I 
think, in one case we looked at there was given time under 
the particular case to allow those corrections to be made 
before coming back to the Court. I think that was in a 
Chapter 11 case. That's not our situation here, so I'm not 
going to order it, but I'm just saying somebody needs to 
take a look at them. However, since the Court determines 
that qualified under 401(a) is a higher standard than 
described in 78-23-5-1(a)(x), the debtor need not present 
strict compliance with the Internal Revenue Code 
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requirements to claim the exemption. 
The Court is aware of the cases cited by the 
Trustee; mainly, In re: Lawrence from Florida, In re: Gold 
and In re: Goldsheim from Maryland from my cjood friend Judge 
Kier who I'm going to see in another week oxt two, and 1*11 
tell him we looked at his case and others. Those cases 
interpreted the relevant state exemption statutes which 
require the plans to be qualified under the applicable 
section of the Internal Revenue Code in ord^r to be exempt. 
The court finds that these cases are distinguishable because 
the Utah exemption statute uses broader language than the 
language used in the exemption statutes in tjhose cases. 
The Court has also reviewed the Supreme Court case 
of Yeates vs. Hendon invoked by the Trustee in his opening 
and closing arguments. At first glance this case does 
appear to have some impact on the legitimacy of the debtor's 
Keogh plan because the Supreme Court ruled that to be a part 
of the --an ARISA plan, there must be more employees than 
just the owner and the owner's spouse. Thi$ Court, however, 
finds that Yeates specifically deals with ttye ARISA Title I 
employee benefit plans in which the employed acts as an 
administrator and trustee of the plan funds for multiple 
employees. This is not the case here with tthe debtor's 
Keogh plan. Yeates refers to 29 CFR 2510.3+3 (b) 2003 which 
states that, "A so-called Keogh or HR-10 pl^n under which 
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only partners or only a sole proprietor participants covered 
under the plan will not be covered under Title I. " Yeates 
also recites to Schwartz vs. Gordon which clarifies the 
difference between the ARISA Title I and Title II 
situations. Schwartz states that there is a distinction 
drawn between the definition of employee benefit plan, as 
used in Title I, for protection of workers employed by 
others, and the definition of the term as used in Title II, 
to ensure tax benefits on an equal basis to self-employed 
individuals and others with respect to their retirement 
funds. Schwartz further notes that the Self-Employed 
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 permits a 
self-employed individual to establish his own pension plan, 
commonly called a Keogh plan, and to qualify for certain 
favorable tax benefits. 
Based upon this Court • s view of Yeates and the 
explanation provided under the distinction between the ARISA 
Title I and Title II plans, as clarified in the Schwartz 
case -- now, the Schwartz case is a 2nd Circuit case 1985, 
but I find it persuasive to this Court, and I elect to 
follow its reasoning. And based upon those explanations and 
distinction, the Court determines that Yeates is factually 
distinguishable and is not controlling in this case because 
the Keogh plan here does not fall under Title I that was 
discussed in Yeates. 
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Now, that's the broad overview. There's still the 
10,000 and the 10,4 checks. The Court next considers those 
issues of whether the 10,000 check date# December 31, '98, 
from the PC to the combination plan and the $10,400 loan 
made to Colleen Parker on December 17, '99, should be deemed 
contributions made or on behalf of the debtor within one 
year of the petition date. 
The Trustee argued that even jlf the plan is exempt 
or the funds in the plan exempt -- and t want to make it 
clear here. Sometimes I refer to the p}.an being exempt. 
It's really the funds in the plan being exempt. The 
contributions may --he argues that the contributions were 
made within one year of the filing and, therefore, not 
exempt under 78-23-5-1(b)(ii). The Trustee argues that the 
two contributions were made within one year of the petition. 
The first non-exempt contribution, he argues, is the $10,000 
check dated December 31, '98, but not deposited by Charles 
Schwaub until February '99. The second non-exempt 
contribution is 10,400 based upon the checks of December 17, 
1999, which was a payment to the fund which was then 
immediately loaned out to Colleen Parket. 
The Trustee asserts both of tl^ ese payments were 
within one year of the petition date, January 28, 2000. The 
Trustee realized on the cases that inteitpret the preference 
laws for the proposition that the effective date of the 
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transfer is a date that the check clears the drawee bank. 
Specifically, the Trustee invokes Barnhill vs. Johnson from 
our U.S. Supreme Court 1992 which states that there is no 
transfer until a check is honored because, until that time, 
the debtor retains an interest in the property. 
Under 78-23-5-(b)(ii), the exemption granted by 
Subsection 1(a)(x) does not apply to amounts contributed or 
benefits accrued by or on behalf of the debtor within one 
year before the debtor files for bankruptcy. There was a 
$10,000 contribution to the plan that was made by the PC and 
not the debtors The statute, however, clearly states that 
any amounts contributed by or on behalf of a debtor within 
one year before the debtor files bankruptcy are not exempt. 
The Court determines that the contribution of the 
PC was on behalf of the debtor. The Court is further 
persuaded that the cases supporting the preference theory 
that the effective date of the contribution was February 10, 
1999. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes that the 
contribution of that amount was made within one year of the 
date of the petition and, therefore, not exempt. 
As for the Parker loan of 10,400 paid by two 
checks dated December 17, * 99, respectfully, the parties 
stipulated that this was a contribution to the plan as 
conspicuously noted on the checks. That's Exhibit --
Trustee's Exhibit 14. Specifically, the memo line on the 
10th Cir Aplt App 
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check 1346 and 1337 state, "Contribution to retirement plan. 
Loan by retirement plan to Colleen Parkeit." Accordingly, 
the contribution to the plan, by way of 4 loan to Colleen 
Parker, was clearly made within one year of the petition 
date and, therefore, not exempt under 78-423-5-1 (b) (ii) . 
The debtor suggested that ther^ is an ordinary 
course of business exception for contributions made within 
one year of the petition date. The debtor argues that In 
re: Kuntz from our Utah Supreme Court in a 2004 case stands 
for the proposition that normal ordinary payments are not 
what are intended to be covered under th^ one-year exception 
to retirement fund exemptions under 78-2^-5- (b) (2) . The 
Court disagrees and finds that no such ordinary payment or 
ordinary course of business exception is articulated in 
Kuntz. 
This Court had some say in referring that matter 
over to the Supreme Court, Judge Clark ar^ d I had two cases 
regarding rollover retirement plans, and we struggled with 
the issue of whether or not a rollover was a contribution 
within one year, and we certified it to tihe Supreme Court. 
And so there's a little bit of factual difference here. I 
disagree with the debtor's argument, and I find that there 
is no exception, as articulate in Kuntz. The decision in 
Kuntz discusses the policy behind the on^-year in the 
context of rollovers between exempt accounts. That is not 
10th Cir. Aptt App. 
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the case here; therefore, Kuntz is not applicable on this 
point. 
Based upon the evidence presented and the cases 
relied upon herein, the court determines that the 
combination plan is property of the estate. Even though the 
property is property of the estate, the Court determines the 
Trustee has not met his burden in showing that the funds in 
the combination plan are not exempt under 78-23-5-1 (a) (x) . 
However, the Court determines that the Trustee has met his 
burden of showing that the $10,000 payment by the PC to the 
Keogh plan and the $10,400 Parker loan were contributions 
made by or on behalf of the debtor within one year of the 
petition date, accordingly. These amounts totaling $20,400 
are not exempt. 
I'm going to ask Mr. Gillman to prepare an order 
in judgment in connection with this matter referring to the 
fact that the Court made its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the record, and it was based upon 
those that the Court orders that the -- whatever I said --
that the amounts are exempt except for those two which come 
back and should be turned over and paid to the Trustee 
forthwith. 
MR. GILLMAN: I will be happy to prepare such an order, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate, again, the parties' 
10thCir.Aptt.App 
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participation. The Court stands in recess 
(Proceedings concluded at 3:13 p.m.) 
10th Cir Aplt App 
DLG00058 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
I, Amanda Richards, court approved transcriber, 
certify that; 
The foregoing is a correct transcript from the 
official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in 
the above-entitled matter. 
££-^4^^ y ^ ^ r 7 
Amanda Richards, CSR Date 
10th Cir Aplt App 
DLG00059 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Debtor. 
DAVID L. GLAD WELL, Trustee, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Appellee. 
ORDfeR AFFIRMING 
BANKRUPTCY COURT ORDERS 
Case No. 2.08CV562 DAK 
This matter is before the court on the Trustee's appeal of two decisions by the Bankruptcy 
Court Oral argument on the appeal was heard on February 4, 2009 At the hearing, the 
Trustee, David L Gladwell, was represented by Adam S Affleck, and the Debtor, Douglas 
James Reinhart, was represented by Duane H Gillman Before the ipeanng, the court carefully 
considered the bnefs and other matenals submitted by the parties Since taking the motions 
under advisement, the court has further considered the law and facts) 
being fully advised, the court renders the following Order 
The Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the funds contained in Debtor's Keogh Plan are 
exempt under Utah Code Ann § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) (2000) is affirmed for the same reasons 
explained by the Bankruptcy Court in the oral ruling on May 15, 2008 See Transcript, Volume 
relating to this appeal Now 
10th Of Aplt App 
DLG00373 
Case 2:08-cv-00562-DAK Document 19 Filed 02/06/2009 Page 2 of 2 
///, dated May 15, 2008, attached as Exhibit 5 to Appellant's Opening brief Appendix. 
Next, the Trustee contends that the Bankruptcy Court's Turnover Order should have 
included post-contribution earnings on the $20,400 that was excepted from the exemption. It 
appears that the Bankruptcy Court exercised its equitable powers to limit the turnover amount to 
the principal amount contributed to the Keogh plan. The court finds no error in the Bankruptcy 
Court's decision and therefore affirms the decision. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the two Bankruptcy Court Orders at issue 
in this case are AFFIRMED, and this case is now closed. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
~L>J- 4. h Tt„/£, 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
10th Cir. Aplt App 
DLG00374 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
In re 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Debtor. 
DAVID L. GLADWELL, Trustee 
Appellant, 
v. 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Appellee. 
F I L E D 
United States Court of Appeals 
DEC ZZ 2009 
ELISABETH A, SriUMAKER 
Clerk 
No. 09-4028 
(D.t. No. 2:08-cv-562) 
(D. Utah) 
ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTION 
Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM 
This case turns on whether Mr. Douglas Reinhart's (Debtor) Keogh Plan should 
have been exempted from his estate when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. To be 
exempt, the Utah Code requires the plan be "described by" Section 401(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000).' The Bankruptcy Court found 
the Keogh Plan was operationally in default on the Petition pate and would not be 
'This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(a)(xw) (2008). 
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"qualified" under § 401(a) but was nonetheless "described" by the section and therefore 
exempt. 
The Bankruptcy Court also excluded from the exemption the $20,400 Debtor had 
paid into his Keogh during the year preceding filing for bankruptcy but the court did not 
exclude the earnings stemming from that amount. The Trustee, Mr. David L. Gladweil, 
appealed to the District Court arguing an unqualified plan cannot be described by section 
40 i (a) and the court erred by failing to include the earnings of the contributed amount. 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's holdings. This appeal followed. 
Since the disposition of this appeal centers on an important and unsettled question 
of the interpretation of Utah's bankruptcy statutes, we certify on our own motion, 
pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this issue 
to the Utah Supreme Court: 
I. Can a Keogh plan be "described by" section 401 (a) of the 
IRC despite failing to fulfill that section's requirements for 
qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the plan from 
his bankruptcy estate property? 
Because the resolution of the second issue, of whether the appropriate amount was 
excluded from the exemption, depends on the resolution of the first issue, we will stay its 
consideration until the Utah Supreme Court has decided the first issue. 
I. Background 
On January 28, 2000, Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In 
his amended schedule he claimed a $333,835.65 exemption for his Keogh plan under 
- 2 -
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(l)(a)(x) (2000). This statute permits the funds in a Keogh 
plan that is "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue pode to be exempt from the 
claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy, 
David Gladwell is the Trustee and he objected to the exemption on two bases: (1) 
because of operational defaults, the Keogh plan was not qualified under § 401(a) and 
therefore not described by the section and (2) even if the plan was qualified, the amount 
contributed in the year prior to the Petition Date would not be exempt from the exemption 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) (2000).2 
From 1992 until the Petition Date, Debtor was an anesthesiologist He worked as a 
sole practitioner until 1996 when he incorporated his practice. In 1992, Debtor 
established his Keogh plan by adopting a prototype plan offered through Charles Schwab 
& Co. Debtor was at all relevant times the sole employee uhder the plan and no one else 
participated in or contributed to the plan. 
One of the non-waivable requirements of the plan w^s that all eligible employees 
be made participants. Although Debtor's wife was an eligible employee from 1993 until 
the Petition Date, she was never included as a participant ui^der the plan. Debtor also 
failed to have his incorporated practice adopt the Keogh pl^n so he remained as if he was 
a self-employed individual despite the fact he was not. Although Debtor did make yearly 
contributions to the plan, they were not the 10% of each participant's annual 
compensation as the Keogh plan's documents required. Debtor also failed to have the 
2This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(b)(i|i) (2008). 
- 3 -
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contributions made through Schwab as the custodian of the Keogh and instead directly 
made the investments himself. Debtor additionally made an automobile loan to Colleen 
Parker through the Keogh plan. In 2000, Debtor caused contributions to be made that 
were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits pursuant to § 415(c) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
At trial, Trustee's expert, W. Waldan Lloyd, testified each of these defects would 
have disqualified the Keogh plan for tax purposes under § 401(a). Mr. Lloyd also 
testified each of those defects was curable through certain IRS procedures. The 
Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) enables employers to self-
correct operational errors in their Keogh plans in order to avoid sanctions and tax 
consequences the IRS would otherwise be authorized to impose. All of the defects that 
made the Keogh plan operationally in default were curable through EPCRS. The IRS had 
neither previously qualified nor disqualified the plan. 
The Bankruptcy Court decided the Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on 
the Petition Date. Although the plan was "arguably not tax qualified" it was 
"nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)" and therefore exempt from the estate. Aplt 
App. at 51. The Bankruptcy Court relied heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding the term "provided for under 401(a)" was broader than "qualified 
under"and thus a non-qualified plan was still conditionally exempted), and decided a plan 
could be described by § 401(a) without being qualified. Id. The court found $20,400 had 
been contributed to the Keogh in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy and excluded that 
- 4 -
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portion of the plan from the exemption. Id. at 28, 31. The cpurt did not include any 
earnings from that amount. Id, 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, trustee appealed. 
II. Discussion 
Whether a "Described" Plan Must be a "Qualified" Plai^  
Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the 
bankruptcy code. Therefore, the only exemptions available are under Utah law. See 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b); former Utah Code Ann, § 78-23-15 (2000}; current Utah Code Ann, § 
78B-5-513 (2008). On the Petition Date, Utah Code Ann. j 78-23-5 read: 
(l)(a) an individual is entitled to exemption of the 
following property:... 
(x) except as provided in Subseption (l)(b), any 
money or other assets held for or payable to tie individual as 
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan 
or arrangement that is described in Section 4()l(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414(d), or 414(e) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1^86, as 
amended.... 
(emjphasis added) 
Section 401 is entitled "Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans5 
and subsection (a) lists the "requirements for qualification.^ 
Trustee argues the plain language of Section 78-23 -j>(l)(b)(ii) requires a Keogh 
plan be qualified under Section 401(a) by meeting all of its| requirements in order to be 
described by the Section and thus be exempt from the banJkJruptcy estate. Because the 
- 5 -
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plain language of a statute is the first source a court will examine when interpreting a 
statute, the plain language should control. In re Kunz, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (Utah 2004). 
Since the Keogh Plan in question was operationally in default on the Petition Date and 
did not qualify under Section 401(a), it therefore would not be described by the section. 
Additionally, Trustee asserts if a plan were permitted to not meet the section's 
requirements and yet still be described by that section, such an interpretation would 
render any reference to those requirements meaningless. Since courts are not supposed to 
interpret a statute in a manner that would nullify any portion of its language, such an 
interpretation would be incorrect See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996). 
Furthermore, Trustee argues the analysis of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, is 
inapplicable because that case dealt with a different state's statute and even so the 
Bankruptcy Court misapplied the case. Kaplan *s holding turned on the fact the plan in 
question had previously been certified and its continued exemption depended on the IRS 
refraining from de-certifying the plan. Id. at 697-98 ("If the IRS intervenes at a later date 
and disqualifies the Plan, then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude 
die Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from claims of the 
Debtor's creditors."). 
Debtor argues exemption statutes "are liberally construed in favor of the debtor" 
and thus the Keogh plan in question should be exempt. Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan, 
325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (Utah 1958). The legislative history of the statute is minimal and 
- 6 -
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fails to provide guidance as to the legislative intent. Additionally, since the plan could 
have been remedied using the EPCRS program, any deficiencies were technical in nature 
and should not prevent the court from applying the exemption. Akin to the statute of In 
re Kaplan, this statute permits an unqualified plan to still bd described by the section, and 
the court's policy of interpreting exemption statutes in favor of the debtor support the 
bankruptcy and district court's interpretation of the exemption statute. 162 B.R. at 697 
(describing the exemption statute's language as "very broad[ and that it appears to have 
been drafted to include even plans which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its 
scope"). 
In these circumstances, certification is appropriate. Tflie plain language of the 
statute is ambiguous, the legislative history offers little guidance and the Utah courts have 
not previously squarely dealt with this issue. If the Utah Co i^e was written to exempt 
from bankruptcy Keogh plans that fail to meet the qualifications of section 401(a) but are 
nonetheless described by the section then the bankruptcy an# district courts were correct. 
If the Utah Code was written to integrate the Internal Revenue Code and have only those 
plans that met the requirements laid out in section 401(a) be exempt from bankruptcy then 
the courts were incorrect and should be reversed. 
ILL Conclusion 
The Utah courts do not appear to have answered the question before us. Since this 
is a controlling question it is appropriate it be certified to th^ Utah Supreme Court. In the 
interests of comity and federalism, the Utah Supreme Court should be permitted to 
- 7 -
Dbtf ; ! 1 : .5139!!!!!Epdvn f oq!121294471: 9!!!!!Ebtf !qrfie;!23CB3CB11: !!!!!Qbhf ;!9 
answer this question in the first instance if it should choose to do so under Utah R. App. 
P. 41. 
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to counsel 
for all parties. The Clerk will also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy 
of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court. 
We will appreciate the consideration of this request. This appeal is ordered 
STAYED pending consideration of the certified question. 
For the Court, 
Deanell R. Tacha, Circuit Judge 
- 8 -
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
January 25,2010 
Elisabeth A. Shumaker 
Clerk of Court 
In re: DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Debtor. 
DAVID L. GLAD WELL, Trustee, 
Appellant, 
v. 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Appellee. 
ORDER 
No. 09-4028 
Before TACHA, HOLLO WAY and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 
This matter is before the court on appellee's Petitio^i For Panel Rehearing. We 
have construed the request as a motion to reconsider, as judgment has not entered in this 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1). As construed, the motion seeks reconsideration of 
the court's December 23, 2009 certification order to the Utjah Supreme Court. The 
request is granted in part. An amended certification order $hall issue. The request is 
granted to the extent of those amendments, but is otherwise denied. The Clerk is directed 
Case: 09-4028 Document: 01018355351 Date Filed: 01/25/2010 Page: 2 
to forward the amended order to the Utah Supreme Court forthwith. 
Entered for the Court, 
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER 
Clerk of Court 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
In re 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Debtor. 
DAVID L. GLADWELL, Trustee 
Appellant, 
v. 
DOUGLAS JAMES REINHART, 
Appellee. 
*. riled StaU . .
 u of App^H 
Tenth Circuit 
JAW 25 mv 
EL1SA 
No. 09-4028 
(DjC. No. 2:08-cv-562) 
(D. Utah) 
ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTION 
Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM 
This case turns on whether Mr. Douglas Reinhart's (Debtor) Keogh Plan should 
have been exempted from his estate when he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. To be 
exempt, the Utah Code requires the plan be "described in" Section 401(a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC). Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5 (2000).' The Bankruptcy Court found 
the Keogh Plan was operationally in default on the Petition Date and would not be 
'This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(a)(^iv) (2008). 
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"qualified" under § 401(a) but was nonetheless "described" in the section and therefore 
exempt. 
The Bankruptcy Court also excluded from the exemption the $20,400 Debtor had 
paid into his Keogh during the year preceding filing for bankruptcy but the court did not 
exclude the earnings stemming from that amount. The Trustee, Mr. David L. Gladwell, 
appealed to the District Court arguing an unqualified plan cannot be described in section 
401 (a) and the court erred by failing to include the earnings of the contributed amount. 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's holdings. This appeal followed. 
Since the disposition of this appeal centers on an important and unsettled question 
of the interpretation of Utah's bankruptcy statutes, we certify on our own motion, 
pursuant to Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, this issue 
to the Utah Supreme Court: 
1. Can a Keogh plan be "described in" section 401 (a) of the 
IRC despite failing to fulfill that section's requirements for 
qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the plan from 
his bankruptcy estate property? 
Because the resolution of the second issue, of whether the appropriate amount was 
excluded from the exemption, depends on the resolution of the first issue, we will stay its 
consideration until the Utah Supreme Court has decided the first issue. 
I. Background 
On January 28, 2000, Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In 
his amended schedule he claimed a $333,835.65 exemption for his Keogh plan under 
- 2 -
Case: 09-4028 Document: 01018355394 Date Filbd: 01/25/2010 Page: 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(a)(x) (2000). This statute permits the funds in a Keogh 
plan that is "described in" § 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code to be exempt from the 
claims of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy. 
David Gladwell is the Trustee and he objected to the exemption on two bases: (1) 
because of operational defaults, the Keogh plan was not qualified under § 401(a) and 
therefore not described in the section and (2) even if the plan was qualified, the amount 
contributed in the year prior to the Petition Date would not] be exempt from the exemption 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) (2000).2 
From 1992 until the Petition Date, Debtor was an anesthesiologist. He worked as a 
sole practitioner until 1996 when he incorporated his practjice. In 1992, Debtor 
established his Keogh plan by adopting a prototype plan offered through Charles Schwab 
& Co, Debtor was at all relevant times the sole employee under the plan and no one else 
participated in or contributed to the plan. 
One of the non-waivable requirements of the plan v^as that all eligible employees 
be made participants. Although Debtor's wife was an eligible employee from 1993 until 
the Petition Date, she was never included as a participant ijmder the plan. Debtor also 
failed to have his incorporated practice adopt the Keogh pfan so he remained as if he was 
a self-employed individual despite the fact he was not. Although Debtor did make yearly 
contributions to the plan, they were not the 10% of each participant's annual 
compensation as the Keogh plan's documents required. D|ebtor also failed to have the 
2This statute is now Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-505(l)(b)(ii) (2008). 
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contributions made through Schwab as the custodian of the Keogh and instead directly 
made the investments himself. Debtor additionally made an automobile loan to Colleen 
Parker through the Keogh plan. In 2000, Debtor caused contributions to be made that 
were $1,455.75 in excess of the maximum contributions limits pursuant to § 415(c) of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 
At trial, Trustee's expert, W. Waldan Lloyd, testified each of these defects would 
have disqualified the Keogh plan for tax purposes under § 401(a). Mr. Lloyd also 
testified each of those defects was curable through certain IRS procedures. The 
Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System (EPCRS) enables employers to self-
correct operational errors in their Keogh plans in order to avoid sanctions and tax 
consequences the IRS would otherwise be authorized to impose. All of the defects that 
made the Keogh plan operationally in default were curable through EPCRS. The IRS had 
neither previously qualified nor disqualified the plan. 
The Bankruptcy Court decided the Keogh plan was "operationally in default" on 
the Petition Date. Although the plan was "arguably not tax qualified" it was 
"nonetheless, described in Section 401(a)" and therefore exempt from the estate. Aplt 
App. at 51. The Bankruptcy Court relied heavily on In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding the term "provided for under 401(a)" was broader than "qualified 
under"and thus a non-qualified plan was still conditionally exempted), and decided a plan 
could be described in § 401 (a) without being qualified. Id. The court found $20,400 had 
been contributed to the Keogh in the year prior to filing for bankruptcy and excluded that 
- 4 -
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portion of the plan from the exemption. Id, at 28, 3 L The Court did not include any 
earnings from that amount Id. 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. [Trustee appealed. 
II. Discussion 
Whether a "Described" Plan Must be a "Qualified" Ptyn 
Utah's legislature has opted out of the federal exemptions provided under the 
bankruptcy code. Therefore, the only exemptions available are under Utah law. See 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b); former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-15 (200(|); current Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-5-513 (2008). On the Petition Date, Utah Code Ann. J} 78-23-5 read: 
(l)(a) an individual is entitled to exemption of the 
following property: ... 
(x) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), any 
money or other assets held for or payable to pie individual as 
a participant or beneficiary from or an interest of the 
individual as a participant or beneficiary in a retirement plan 
or arrangement that is described in Section 4b 1(a), 401(h), 
401(k), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 408A, 409, 414M), or 414(e) of 
the United States Internal Revenue Code of \ 986, as 
amended.... 
(enjiphasis added) 
Section 401 is entitled "Qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans55 
and subsection (a) lists the "requirements for qualification!' 
Trustee argues the plain language of Section 78-23-5(1 )(b)(ii) requires a Keogh 
plan be qualified under Section 401(a) by meeting all of iW requirements in order to be 
described in the Section and thus be exempt from the bankruptcy estate. Because the 
- 5 -
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plain language of a statute is the first source a court will examine when interpreting a 
statute, the plain language should control. In re Kunz, 99 P.3d 793, 794 (Utah 2004). 
Since the Keogh Plan in question was operationally in default on the Petition Date and 
did not qualify under Section 401(a), it therefore would not be described in the section. 
Additionally, Trustee asserts if a plan were permitted to not meet the section's 
requirements and yet still be described in that section, such an interpretation would render 
any reference to those requirements meaningless. Since courts are not supposed to 
interpret a statute in a manner that would nullify any portion of its language, such an 
interpretation would be incorrect. See Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 
1292 (Utah 1996). 
Furthermore, Trustee argues the analysis of In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, is 
inapplicable because that case dealt with a different state's statute and even so the 
Bankruptcy Court misapplied the case. Kaplan Js holding turned on the fact the plan in 
question had previously been certified and its continued exemption depended on the IRS 
refraining from de-certifying the plan. Id. at 697-98 ("If the IRS intervenes at a later date 
and disqualifies the Plan, then and only then would it appear to us appropriate to preclude 
the Debtor from continuing to assert that its proceeds are exempt from claims of the 
Debtor's creditors."). 
Debtor argues exemption statutes "are liberally construed in favor of the debtor" 
and thus the Keogh plan in question should be exempt. Russell M Miller Co. v. Givan, 
325 P.2d 908, 909-10 (Utah 1958). The legislative history of the statute is minimal and 
- 6 -
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fails to provide guidance as to the legislative intent. Additionally, since the plan could 
have been remedied using the EPCRS program, any deficiencies were technical in nature 
and should not prevent the court from applying the exemption. Akin to the statute of In 
re Kaplan, this statute permits an unqualified plan to still be described in the section, and 
the court's policy of interpreting exemption statutes in favor of the debtor support the 
bankruptcy and district court's interpretation of the exemption statute. 162 B.R. at 697 
(describing the exemption statute's language as "very bro^d, and that it appears to have 
been drafted to include even plans which are not technically 'tax qualified' within its 
scope"). 
In these circumstances, certification is appropriate. The plain language of the 
statute is ambiguous, the legislative history offers little guidance and the Utah courts have 
not previously squarely dealt with this issue. If the Utah Cjode was written to exempt 
from bankruptcy Keogh plans that fail to meet the qualifications of section 401(a) but are 
nonetheless described in the section then the bankruptcy and district courts were correct. 
If the Utah Code was written to integrate the Internal Revenue Code and have only those 
plans that met the requirements laid out in section 401 (a) fye exempt from bankruptcy then 
the courts were incorrect and should be reversed. 
III. Conclusion 
The Utah courts do not appear to have answered the question before us. Since this 
is a controlling question it is appropriate it be certified to fie Utah Supreme Court. In the 
interests of comity and federalism, the Utah Supreme Couft should be permitted to 
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answer this question in the first instance if it should choose to do so under Utah R. App. 
P. 41. 
The Clerk of this court shall transmit a copy of this certification order to counsel 
for all parties. The Clerk will also forward, under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy 
of this certification order and the briefs filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court. 
We will appreciate the consideration of this request This appeal is ordered 
STAYED pending consideration of the certified question. 
For the Court, 
Deanell R. Tacha, Circuit Judge 
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